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Abstract 
Purpose: Examination of the determinants of profitability in the U.S. domestic airline industry by considering operations 
strategy, productivity, and service measures, while focusing the attention on the effects of the 9/11 attack. 
Design/methodology/approach: We propose a series of hypotheses regarding the effect of operations strategy, 
productivity, and service before and after the 9/11 attack. Using quarterly data between 1995 and 2007 we run empirical 
analysis using the Parks time series method. 
Findings: Prior to 9/11, operations strategy, productivity, and service measures are significantly related to profitability. 
However, after 9/11, none of the service measures are significant. Further analysis suggests that after 9/11 passengers are 
more forgivable to service glitches or are associating lack of service with the intensified security measures imposed after 
9/11. We also find that after 9/11, the profitability of full-service carriers is improving faster than that of focused carriers. 
Originality/value: Our work extends earlier work in a variety of directions by accounting for more recent data, larger scope 
of variables, and the consideration of the 9/11 attack. We highlight an important link between an outside shock (9/11) and 
the importance of service that follows this shock. 
Keywords: empirical analysis, 9/11, proﬁtability, quality, operations strategy, airlines 
 
1. Introduction 
A large body of literature has been devoted to explore the determinants of profitability of firms operating in the 
service sector (e.g., Schefczyk, 1993; Dresner & Xu, 1995). Much of the literature has frequently considered a 
limited subset of measures types, often focusing primarily on productivity measures as drivers of profitability. In this 
research, an empirical model is conducted to understand the determinants of the profitability of U.S. domestic 
airlines (an industry which offers access to wealth of data), wherein we segment the contributing measures to three 
primary categories: operations strategy, productivity, and quality of service measures. This industry was critically 
affected by the 9/11 attack, as demand fell sharply and intensified security measures were introduced. 
Consequently, the profitability of airlines has dramatically declined and several airlines have entered Chapter 11 
protection for lengthy periods of time. In the U.S., Chapter 11 defines the bankruptcy code that allows businesses to 
reorganize themselves and obtain protection from debtors (and sometime even reject contracts) during that time. 
In light of this dramatic system-wide shock, we pose the following question: how the determinants of profitability 
changed in the reality that emerged after 9/11?  
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Previous work that has studied determinants of profitability in the airline industry include the contributions by 
Dresner and Xu (1995), Oum, Fu and Yu (2005), Tsikriktsis (2007), as well as Weiss and Mahler (2009). Dresner and 
Xu focused their work on three customer service variables on customer satisfaction and further on firms’ 
profitability; Oum et al. compared major North American airlines based on their residual total factor productivity, 
cost measures, and passenger yields; Tsikriktsis noted the significance difference between focused and non-focused 
airlines (where the former limit their service or operate only in a certain geographical area); and Weiss and Mahler 
incorporated operational hedging in their model. Of these studies, only the latter has accounted for post 9/11 data. 
We argue that strategic decisions, operational performance, and quality of service bear significant importance on 
the financial performance of airlines, measured as the operating profit over operating revenue (OPOR). Indeed, 
similar to Tsikriktsis, prior to 9/11, we find the strategic decisions, as well as both operational and service 
performance measures are significantly related to profitability. However, after 9/11, none of the service measures 
are significant. This lack of significance is vital in the context of this research, and it necessitates further exploration 
of service measures. 
Our work relates to Tsikriktsis’, but we expand it in several directions:  
  We enrich each of the measuring categories by considering additional important variables. Namely, we 
also account for average flight distance and the average number of seats per plane (corporate strategy 
measures as both decisions carry long term impact), productivity per employee (operational measures), 
as well as ticket oversales, i.e., overbooking, and consumer complaints (quality of service measures) 
 We further consider control variables to account for the state of the economy and the bankruptcy status 
of the airline 
 Importantly, we use more recent data and we segregate the time horizon into two epochs, pre and post 
9/11, to gain insights into the performance of the industry and contrast the significance and magnitude of 
the different measures before and after 9/11.  
Performing another set of time series regressions with consumer complaints as a dependent variable, we find that 
prior to 9/11 the only service measure that is significant is the amount of mishandled baggage. This measure is also 
significant after 9/11, but the magnitude of the coefficient drops by one third, providing strong indication that 
consumer complaints dramatically less due to baggage related issues. This could stem from passenger inability of 
distinguishing between baggage issues originating from the airline handling their baggage or by the enhanced 
security measures imposed on airlines and airports after 9/11. Alternatively, consumers might be more forgiving to 
baggage related issues understanding the increased handling efforts required by airlines, or are simply less 
disturbed by lower quality of service. At the same time, boarding denials emerge as a significant determinant after 
9/11: with leaner fleets and pressure to feel up their planes, carriers may have increasingly overbooked their flights, 
which, ultimately have resulted with greater numbers of passengers who were denied boarding.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 related studies—both airline and non-airline—are reviewed, and 
insights from these studies are synthesized. Section 3 describes the time series data that was collected and the 
different measures used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the method used for estimation. The cross-
section time series analyses are provided in Section 5. The different behavior of the service measures before and 
after 9/11 necessitates the analysis of consumers’ complaints in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with a summary of 
our findings, contributions, limitations of the model, and future research directions.  
2. Industry background and determinants of profitability 
The U.S. airline industry  
Significant changes have occurred in the U.S. domestic airline industry since the industry was deregulated in 1978. 
This deregulation has eliminated the U.S. government control over fares. Competition has intensified as new 
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carriers entered the market, all of which have contributed to severe losses to major carriers. Most dramatically was 
the emergence of carriers focused on offering low-cost service. Consequently, the industry’s competitive priorities 
have changed significantly and major air carriers discarded old operating models, which were based on competing 
mainly on flights frequency (Treacy & Wiersema, 1995). The importance of understating the drivers of success in 
this industry has already been recognized (Gudmundsson & Oum, 2004) 
According to Tsikriktsis (2007), the U.S domestic airlines can be classified into two categories: Full-Service Carriers 
(FSCs) and Focused airlines. The former group of airlines, FSCs, uses hub-and-spoke flight structure, which has a 
wide coverage of many city-pairs, through the optimization of hub connectivity. FSCs operate both U.S. domestic 
and international markets, they use vertical product differentiation to capture various market segments, and have 
long adopted customer relationship management, known as frequent flyers program. The FSCs (in our data) are 
American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, United, and US Airways. It shall be noted that the airline industry is 
continuously changing and recently several mergers were announced: Delta-Northwest that took place in 2008 and 
Continental-United in 2010. Our data collection ended before these mergers. 
The Focused airlines category is composed of Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs) and Regional Carriers (RCs)—they limit their 
operations to certain type of service and/or limited geographical area. The flight network structure of LCCs is usually 
point-to-point and the destinations are normally restricted to within the U.S. LCCs offer “no-frills” service (e.g., no 
meal service, no advanced seat selection, no airport lounges), resulting with very limited product differentiation. In 
most cases, the fleet is limited to a single type of airplane (such as the Boeing 737). Typical LCCs include American 
West and Southwest Airlines. RCs generally operate short-haul scheduled services. Usually, their aircrafts are of 
lesser capacity and often they fly under a code sharing agreement with FSCs to deliver passengers to major hubs 
from surrounding communities (e.g., SkyWest, which code shares with Delta Airlines and markets itself as “The 
Delta Connection”). According to Truitt and Haynes (1994) RCs have demonstrated the economic advantages of 
serving smaller markets with smaller, more fuel-efficient, aircrafts. We note that Alaska airlines can be classified 
both as an LCC and as an RC—it appears to be operating according to an LCC mode, focused on the Pacific coast. 
Either way, it belongs to the focused group of airlines. 
In the following subsections, we briefly review studies that examine the impact of operations strategy, productivity 
and service quality, on profitability. Each subsection begins with literature review in service and manufacturing 
organizations, followed by specific studies related to the airline industry. 
The impact of operations strategy on profitability  
A growing body of literature addresses the impact of operations strategy on profitability. Boyer, Hallowell and Roth 
(2002) examines of three operations strategies available to e-services providers to expand offerings and streamline 
services. Boyer and Lewis (2004) consider the operations strategy trade-off between cost, delivery, flexibility and 
quality that advanced manufacturing plants make. Boyer and Lewis’ (2004) finding constructs a strong link between 
operations strategies and profitability. Tsikriktsis (2007) provides review of additional studies that support the link 
between the notion of focused firms and their profitability level. Tsikriktsis’ empirical analysis suggests that the 
focused airlines’ business model outperformed non-focused airlines in terms of profitability between 1988 and 
1998. 
Notable in the airline sector, is the stark difference between Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) and Full Service Carriers 
(FSCs). The two operating modes differ in many aspects, as mentioned in the previous subsection. Belobaba (2009) 
indicates that the average cost per available seat mile (CASM) of FSCs is 50% higher than that of LCCs, 
overwhelming the revenue management advantage of FSCs. He also points out that the average flight distance and 
aircraft size represent specific airline operations strategies. According to Baltagi, Griffin and Daniel (1995), the 
deregulation of the industry in 1978 led to operating cost savings. They note that the deregulation has pronounced 
the effects of route structure. Baltagi et al. also show that while larger aircrafts provide more seating capacity, they 
could, in fact, be more expensive to operate and are more expensive to acquire than smaller ones. According to 
Borenstein (1989), the hub-and-spoke flight structure allows more efficient use of aircrafts and other inputs than 
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point-to-point flight system. Another advantage of hub-and-spoke strategy is in the form of revenue, as often they 
lead to airport dominance by single carriers, which appears to result in higher fares for passengers who fly to or 
from these airports. Borenstein also indicate that long-haul flights exhibit economies of scale resulting in lower per-
passenger costs. In line with the empirical findings from Baltagi et al., Borenstein (1989) and Tsikriktsis (2007), in the 
context of the airline industry, we consider the following operations strategy decisions made by firms: whether to 
be focused or not, the stage length, and the seat density. We further elaborate on these measures in Section 3. 
Along similar lines, Cannon, Randall and Terwiesch (2007) show that operational variables (at both strategic and 
operational levels) carry additional information about airlines’ earnings not provided in models based on earnings 
and accounting components only.  
In line with the above literature, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Operations strategy measures are significantly related to profitability. 
The impact of productivity on profitability  
Several literatures study the relationship between productivity and profitability in manufacturing and service 
operations. Hammesfahr, Pope, and Ardalan (1993) indicate that production capacity decisions have direct impact 
on firms’ competitive positions and profitability, and that improving productivity is most efficient when the process 
is operated at full capacity. Banker, Chang and Majumdar (1993) study the impact of productivity, price recovery, 
product mix and capacity utilization on firms’ profitability in U.S. telecommunications industry—an industry which 
has also gone through a deregulation process. They conclude that productivity is highly associated with changes in 
overall profitability, and show an increasing trend in productivity after the deregulation.  
Heskett, Sasser and Schlesinger (1997) study service profit chain, which establishes the links between productivity 
and financial performance measure. An important finding from this study is that high employees’ satisfaction leads 
to higher productivity and quality of service, which ultimately results in superior financial performance. The service 
profit chain from Heskett et al. (1997) is also related to “the resource-based model of sustained competitive 
advantage” discussed in Barney (1991, 1995). Anderson, Fornell and Lehman (1994) study the relationship between 
productivity, customer satisfaction, and profitability between different goods and services in Sweden. The findings 
indicate that both productivity and customer satisfaction are positively correlated with profitability for goods and 
services, yet the interaction between the two is positive for goods, but significantly negative for services. Hence, 
increasing both customer satisfaction and productivity simultaneously is likely to be more challenging in service 
industries. Other studies that highlight the importance of productivity and the links to profitability include, e.g., 
D’Aveni (1989) and Smith and Reece (1999).  
Several studies specifically examine the impact of productivity on profitability in the airline industry. Using data 
envelopment analysis (DEA), Schefczyk (1993) validates that productivity is positively correlated with the return on 
equity, and further illustrates that productivity measures are one of the important factors in predicting overall 
performance. Oum et al. (2005) measure and compare the performance of ten major North American airlines, and 
one of their major finding is that productivity improvements result in greater operational profits. They indicate that 
airlines need to perform well in both productivity and pricing strategy to be financially successful. Tsikriktsis (2007) 
studies the impact of productivity and service quality measures on profitability using time-series regression analysis. 
An important finding from this paper is that productivity measures—loading factors and aircrafts’ capacity 
utilization—are statistically significant and have positive coefficients when predicting profitability, with different 
magnitudes for FSCs and focused airlines. Weiss and Mahler (2009) add another insight to the importance of load 
factors: in their study on operational risk against adverse events, they find that load factors are positive and 
significant determinants of their hedging score, suggesting that high load factors indicate airlines that operate with 
small capacity cushion—a beneficial feature when demand declines. 
In line with the findings from Banker et al. (1993), Schefzyk (1993), Oum et al. (2005), Tsikriktsis (2007), and Weiss 
and Mahler (2009), we have the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 2: Higher productivity leads to higher profitability.  
In the context considered in this paper, we account for loading factors, aircraft utilization, and available seat miles 
per employee—three measures that accounts for the seats productivity, plane productivity, and employee 
productivity, respectively. There measures are further elaborated in Section 3.  
The impact of (quality of) service on profitability  
Studies concerned with the impact of service on profitability are common within the marketing literature. Empirical 
results from the database of Profit Impact of Marketing Strategies (PIMS) established a link between customer 
satisfaction and economic return in the service industry (Buzzell & Gale, 1987). This has triggered research on the 
relationships between customer satisfaction, market share, and profitability. Reichheld and Sasser (1990) suggest 
that higher customer satisfaction results with greater profit through higher revenues, reduced costs to acquire 
customers, lower customer-price sensitivity, and decreased costs to serve customers familiar with a firm’s service 
delivery system. Fornell (1992) indicates that the costs of attracting new customers are lower for firms that have 
already achieved a high level of customer satisfaction, and that satisfied customers are willing to buy goods and 
services more frequently. Similarly, Ittner and Larcker (1998) claim that service quality influence purchase behavior, 
and that it could significantly reduce the costs of customer retention and acquisition. Anderson et al. (1994) develop 
a model that transforms customer experience from the service and former service expectation into a customer 
satisfaction measure. They conclude that firms with high customer satisfaction benefit from superior economic 
returns in the long-run, but customer satisfaction fell as market share increased. Heskett et al. (1997) indicate that 
poor service quality lead to dissatisfaction among customers, and yield a negative impact on profit.  
Rust, Zahorik and Keiningham (1995) present the “return on quality” approach that quantified the benefits in 
improving service quality in terms of financial measure. Their findings suggest that quality is an investment, but 
excessive spending on quality improvement may result in waste of resources. Voss, Tsikriktsis, Funk, Yarrow, and 
Owen (2005) focus on the customer satisfaction and profitability relationships in private sector organizations. 
Several studies focused on the interaction between service and profitability particularly in banking industry (e.g., 
Garvin, 1988; Hallowell, 1996). 
Few literatures have study the impact of airlines’ service quality on financial performance. Dresner and Xu (1995) 
examine the relationship between three customer service measures (On time performance, ticket oversales, and 
mishandle baggage) and consumer complaints and, in turn, on profitability of U.S. airlines. The results support the 
notion that increasing customer service raise customer satisfaction, which lead to improved financial performance. 
Tsikriktsis (2007) indicate that focused airlines perform better, in terms of profitability, than full-service airlines 
because of their operations strategy on service quality. The empirical results showed that the service measure late 
arrivals has a significant impact on profitability. Based on the above studies, we state the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Higher customer service leads to higher profitability. 
In the empirical analysis conducted in this paper, we include airlines’ on-time performance, mishandled baggage, 
passengers denied boarding (oversales), and consumers complaints, as we elaborate later in Section 3. 
System-wide shock: the Effect of 9/11 on the Airline Industry 
From the mid-1990s to the beginning of the millennium, the profitability of U.S. aviation industry was relatively 
stable. However, in the beginning of 2000, the economic slowdown resulted with lower demand, and the 9/11 
attack in 2001 presented the industry with a major disruption. KLM’s CEO, Leo Van Wijk, made the following 
statement after the terrorist attack: “…many passengers are cancelling their reservations and we can expect 
diminishing loading factors as a result. Demand is diminishing on various international routes and I do not expect 
this to change in near future…” 
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Following the terrorist attack on 9/11, the U.S. airline industry announced a total of 100,000 layoffs and 
employment in October and November fell by almost 8%. The U.S. airline sector had lost around 20% of its value, 
measured in the last quarter of 2001. Consequently, many FSCs were forced to make changes to their business 
structure, operations strategy, and considered other cost cutting measures. Major carriers have declared 
bankruptcy (Northwest, Delta, United, and US Airways) or were under tremendous financial pressures. US Airways 
and United announced code-share agreements, and a similar contract was developed by Continental, Northwest, 
and Delta. Southwest Airlines had taken an equity stake in the financially troubled low cost carrier ATA. Finally, US 
Airways was acquired by American West in 2005, and recently Northwest and Delta have merged. 
Figure 1 exhibits the profitability of airlines before and after 9/11 segmented into full service and focused (Low cost 
and regional) carriers. It is evident that during the years prior to the incident the overall performance of the 
industry, in terms of profitability, was reasonable, and it was fluctuating, on a seasonal basis, between about 4%-
15%. Indeed, shortly before the attack profitability decreased by several percentage points, but there is no doubt 
that in the quarters ensuing 9/11 profitability was catastrophic. Overall, profitability after 9/11 exhibits much lower 
level than before 9/11, for both focused (LCCs and RCs) and FSCs. 
 
Figure 1. Profitability in the U.S. domestic airline industry 
A limited number of studies examine the impact of 9/11 on the airline industry. Hatty and Hollmeier (2003) present 
a European view of the global airline crisis in 2001/2002. They discuss the change in operations strategy at 
Lufthansa German Airlines following the terrorist attacks. Due to the drop of air traffic demand, Lufthansa airline 
rapidly reduced its flight frequencies on long-haul flights, which helped to stabilize yield and corporate results. 
Alderighi and Cento (2004) also provide analysis of European carriers in the context of 9/11, focusing on their 
decision making. They segment the carriers into flexible and non-flexible, where the former are highly responsive 
and are driven by short-term goals, while the latter are typically driven by long-term goals.  
Our interest, based on the findings from the above papers, is to find whether the three groups of measures 
mentioned above—operation strategy, productivity, and service—lead to similar insights before and after 9/11. 
After 9/11 most airlines scaled down their fleet and workforce, yet, despite the financial difficulties the airlines 
were facing, operations strategy and productivity should still play a major role in their profitability. We make the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a: After 9/11, operations strategy measures significant affect profitability. 
Hypothesis 2a: After 9/11, higher productivity leads to higher profitability. 
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However, after 9/11, service may present a completely different pattern. After 9/11, security measures have been 
altered immensely. Subsequently, procedures and processes took different shape, and often, it came on the 
expense of consumer service. That is, as security checking was intensified, passengers have experienced reduced 
service, such as prolonged waiting. As service has deteriorated, it is reasonable to assume that in most cases 
passengers could not distinguish between the real sources of the various delays encountered (of an exception is 
probably the infamous case of JetBlue, whose operations has completely given way on Valentine’s Day in 2007). As 
passengers expect to encounter lower service levels, they may also be more forgivable to other airlines’ service 
failures, and often associate lack of service to intensified security measures. Consequently, we hypothesize that 
after 9/11, higher customer service measures do not necessarily lead to higher profitability. 
Hypothesis 3a: After 9/11, higher customer service does not lead to higher profitability. 
We recognize that in their analysis of the informative value of operational measures in addition to accounting 
components on airlines’ earning between 1998 and 2005, Cannon et al. (2007) find that different operational 
variables are relevant when predicting periods of positive and negative earnings. Particularly, they find that after 
9/11 service quality variables (on-time arrival and involuntary overbooking) became irrelevant and fleet/flight 
structural variables (flight length and seats per flight) became relevant. Hence, our hypothesis regarding customer 
service measures is in line with (and further expand) Cannon et al. Yet, while Cannon et al. merely state this result, 
herein we further seek to provide intuition for these estimation outcomes, as we also analyze determinants of 
consumers’ complaints in Section 6.  
3. Sample and methods 
Sample  
Data on several U.S. domestic airlines, six of which are FSCs (American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, US Airways, 
and United) was collected. Prior to 9/11 we consider the following three focused carriers: Alaska, American West, 
and Southwest, while post 9/11 we replace American West with American Eagle. We shall note that altogether we 
have gathered data on 21 airlines; however, only those with complete data for either before or after 9/11 are 
included in our final analysis. Data is obtained from two main sources: Air Carrier Financial Reports and Air Carrier 
Summary Data for operational data, and Air Travel Consumer Report for service measures. Both data sources are 
available through the Department of Transportation (DOT). The data is collected from the first quarter of 1995 to 
the fourth quarter of 2007 to study profitability before and after 9/11.  
Measures  
Profitability measure 
Similar to Tsikriktsis (2007) and Dresner and Xu (1995), our dependent variable is a percentagewise measure of 
operating profit over operating revenue (OPOR), calculated for each airline on a quarterly basis. This measure only 
considers the financial report from transporting passengers, excluding cargo shipping. The OPOR measure is 
preferred over other profitability measures (such as net profits, or return on investment), as it overcomes 
differences in accounting measures concerning owning versus leasing airplanes, interest on loans, etc., and it 
removes the size effect of airlines. Hereafter, whenever we use the term profitability we refer to the above-
mentioned relative profitability.  
Operations strategy measures 
Operations strategy measures are designated to differentiate carriers based on their operations structure. For 
example, focused airlines operate very differently than FSCs (the former mostly use Point-to-point, while the latter 
employ Hub-and-Spoke), or an airline’s seating capacity and the average stage length could suggest something 
about the structure of the network and markets served (in general the last two measures are smaller for LCCs). We 
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account for the following five operations strategy measures: Focused, FSC*Time, Focused*Time, Stage Length, and 
Seat Density. Focused is a dummy variable that accounts for differences between focused and FSCs, and it takes a 
value of 1 when the airline is focused and a value of 0 otherwise (i.e., an FSC). The differences between these two 
airline types we covered earlier in Subsection 2.1. We expect focused and FSCs to behave and react differently over 
time to market changes. That is, in the spirit of Alderighi and Cento (2004), we investigate whether focused airlines 
are more responsive than FSCs. Hence, we consider the interaction variables FSC*time and Focused*time. In other 
words, we separate the time factor for the two types of airlines. The variable Stage Length accounts for the average 
distance flown in statute miles per aircraft departure. According to Belobaba (2009), operating large planes is 
expected to generate some economies of scale (reduction in unit costs with increased output) as its fixed costs are 
spread over a larger output of available seat miles (ASM—the domestic air miles flown in each inter-airport hop 
multiplied by the total number of seats available on that hop for revenue passenger use). Therefore, we consider 
the variable Seat Density, which measures the average seating configuration of an airline’s operating fleet, and it is 
derived by dividing total available domestic seat miles flown by the number of aircraft miles flown.  
Productivity measures  
Airline productivity measures are used to evaluate the firms’ usage efficiency. We have three productivity 
measures which reflect three levels of productivity within the operations of airlines: seat usage of the plane 
(Loading Factor), time usage of the planes (Aircraft Utilization), and employees’ productivity (ASM per Employee). 
Loading factor is the capacity utilization in terms of passengers, and it is determined by dividing revenue passenger 
miles (RPM—the summation of the products of revenue aircraft miles flown on each inter-airport hop multiplied by 
the number of revenue passengers carried on that hop) over ASM. Aircraft Utilization is the percentage of total 
block hours that aircrafts operate in the air, discarding on-ground services. ASM per employee (ASME) is the ASM 
produced by each employee in the firm. Note, that all productivity measures in this study consider passengers 
related aspects only, and do not account for cargo. 
Service measures 
We consider four service variables in this study: On-Time Flight, Mishandled Baggage, Ticket Oversales, and 
Consumer Complaints. On-Time Flight is the percentage of airline on-time performance. A flight is counted as “on-
time” if it arrives to the airport not later than 15 minutes after its scheduled time (from the carriers’ Computerized 
Reservation Systems). All cancelled and diverted flights are also counted as delayed. Mishandled Baggage counts 
the lost, damaged, delayed or pilfered baggage per 1000 passengers every month for each airline. Since the DOT 
reports the above two measures on a monthly basis, we convert them into quarterly basis to align with the other 
measures. 
Tickets Oversales are the total number of passengers denied boarding per 10,000 enplanements and it also consists 
of both voluntary and involuntary categories of overbooking. Consumer Complaints is the number of complaints 
filed per 100,000 passengers. We maintain this measure in its aggregated basis, though it can be broken down into 
categories of complaints (flight problem, baggage, reservation, boarding, customer service, refunds, disability, 
frequent flyer program, fares, discrimination and advertising). 
We realize that that Consumer Complaints may be an outcome of the other three service measures. Table A 4 and 
Table A 5 in the Appendix reveal potentially minor concern of multicolinearity. 2SLS is not available with the Parks 
methods used in this study. However, regressing the empirical models separately where service measures include 
only the first 3 measures vs. only Consumer Complaints, we find that the coefficients and significance levels are very 
similar to those reported in this study. That is, the results reported are not driven by multicolinearity. 
Control variables 
As mentioned earlier, the decline in airlines’ profitability may have started prior to 9/11, potentially caused by the 
bursting of the dot com bubble. With the sharp decline in stock markets the economy has contracted. To account 
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for variations in the state of the economy, we add a control variable that measures the performance of the stock 
market. Namely, we use the S&P500 as an indicator for the economy. We note that replacing S&P500 with the GDP 
does not alter the quality of results of variables of interest. We prefer the S&P500 as it aggregates anticipations 
regarding the direction of the economy. 
Airlines that enter a bankruptcy stage may be subject to different set of rules as they are under bankruptcy 
protection and go through a major reconstruction and reorganization shift. To account for different behavior during 
this stage, we add a dummy Bankruptcy, which takes a value of 1 when the airline is in a bankruptcy status during 
the corresponding quarter, and 0 otherwise. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are summarized in Table A1 and Table A2. These tables reveal that the 
focused airlines were more profitable both before and after 9/11, and both suffered after 9/11, though FSCs 
appear to have been more affected. Focused airlines have a shorter stage length (likely stemming from their point-
to-point network configuration) and a lower seat density (namely, they usually operate smaller aircrafts). Prior to 
9/11, focused airlines appear to have been more productive in terms of aircraft utilization and ASME. However, 
after 9/11, FSCs have closed these productivity gaps. Service measures seem to have been similar for both focused 
and FSCs prior to 9/11. Though complaints have dropped for both after 9/11, focused airlines attracted a much 
smaller number of them after 9/11. 
4. Model 
Following Tsikriktsis (2007), we use the time-series method developed by Parks (1967), which accounts for the 
following effects: autocorrelation (that may occur due to the nature of time-series data), heteroscedasticity (as 
variances of different airlines may be different due to their different scales), and contemporaneous correlation (due 
to potential relationships between airlines). This method is facilitated through the time-series cross section 
regression (TSCSREG) procedure in SAS (SAS/ETS 1993). Let uit denote the random errors, with i=1,2,…,N, and 
t=1,2,…,T, where N represents the total number of airlines studied and T represents total time period analyzed, then 
the errors uit have the following structure: 
 
The following model is used for testing the coefficient and significance of the different measures. 
OPORit= o + 1Focusedi + 2FSC Timeit + 3Focused Timeit + 4Stage Lengthit + 5Seat Densityit + 
6Loading Factorit + 7Aircraft Utilizationit + 8ASM per Employeeit + 9OnTime Flightit + 
10Mishandled Baggageit + 11Ticket Oversalesit + 12Customer Complaintsit  
5. Empirical results and discussion 
Pre 9/11 analysis 
The estimation results are provided in Table 1. The model explains 63% of the variations in profitability. The 
empirical results provide some interesting insights with regard to the impact of the independent variables on 
profitability.  
 Operations strategy measures. We find that the dummy variable Focused is not significant, and that the 
profitability of both types of airlines was decreasing over time (both Focused*Time and FSC*Time are 
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significant and negative). A distinctive operational aspect between focused and FSCs is that they employ 
point-to-point and hub-and-spoke networks, respectively. Since so, it is important to identify the role of 
the supporting operation strategy measures. In that respect, we find that Stage Length is significant and 
negative, implying that serving longer haul destinations does not necessarily lead to the expected 
revenues and/or cost savings, as suggested by Belobaba (2009). This negative effect could be driven by 
certain costs that may increase more than linearly with stage length (such as labor cost), and by the fact 
that long-haul flights are usually operated by senior pilots that have higher wage rates. Interestingly, seat 
density has no predictive power. Overall, we find several operations strategy measures with significant 
explanatory power. As expected, operations strategy measures are important factors in explaining 
profitability and we conclude that Hypothesis 1 has been validated. In the appendix we further explore 
the relative importance of the various categories. Therein we find the operations strategy is the single 
most important category in predicting profitability. 
 Productivity measures. We find that Loading Factor has a positive and a significant coefficient in 
predicting profitability—the more seats are sold, presumably, the greater is the revenue, and hence the 
profitability. Higher loading factors further indicate overall operational success. That is, the airline 
manages to identify markets with sufficient demand and the revenue management of the firm works well 
in predicting the demand for the flights. Indeed, higher loading factors can be manipulated by offering 
heavily reduced fares, but such a strategy is not sustainable in the long term, as passengers will learn to 
expect such behavior and will wait for the lower fares to be available. In that respect, when an airline 
manages to fill the planes in a consistent manner it sends a clear message to consumers: there is 
sufficient demand for this flight, hence, the plane can be easily filled up without offering heavy discounts. 
Consequently, consumers do not develop expectations regarding possible last minute discounts and their 
motivation to wait diminishes. High fill-rates further sends a signal to investor and financial markets that 
the airline is properly matching demand with supply and well manages its portfolio of destinations, 
frequencies, and capacities. 
Quite surprisingly, we don’t find Aircraft Utilization and ASME to be significant prior to 9/11. According to 
Gittell (2003), one of Southwest Airlines’ success drivers is the higher aircraft utilization, due to the 
significantly lower turnaround time. At Southwest, this amounts to about 20-30 minutes compared with 
approximately 1.5-2 hours at most network airlines at their connecting hubs, since these airlines need to 
ensure flight connections for passengers and baggage. Belobaba (2009) recommends airlines to improve 
aircraft utilization by reducing the turnaround time. He further suggests increasing the number of seats 
on each aircraft without switching to a larger plane size (e.g., by replacing first/business class seats with 
more economy-class seats, or by reducing the distance between adjacent rows of seats). This, however, 
may be detrimental, as discussed above, if the airline does not manage to fill up these additional seats 
(and recall, that we don’t find seat density to be a significant driver of profits). 
Overall, we find that the single most important productivity measure in the context of US domestic 
airlines before 9/11 is the seat productivity. The other two productivity measures—plane productivity 
(i.e., aircraft utilization) and employee productivity—are not significant prior to 9/11. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
has been partially supported. 
 Service measures. Quite naturally, the more consumer complaints are associated with a particular airline, 
the less likely they are to return and fly with this airline again in the future, and through word-of-mouth 
their bad experience may further percolate. Indeed, we find Consumer Complaints to be negative and 
significant in predicting profitability. Though, consumer complaints are affecting airlines in the long term, 
our finding reveals that they are harming airlines also in the short term.  
This notion of the link between consumer complaints and profitability is further corroborated by the 
“zone of tolerance” argument by Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman (1993), which states that the zone of 
tolerance is tighter for the service quality dimension which is most critical to firms’ financial success. In 
the airline industry, passengers experience is a major competitive strength, which has a narrow zone of 
Journal of Airline and Airport Management 2(1), 1-21 
 
11 
 
tolerance for unsatisfactory services that is then transformed to consumer complaints and is reflected on 
airlines profitability. This argument regarding service “zone of tolerance” is certainly valid in the pre 9/11 
era. Yet, over time the competition in this industry appear to have shifted from service-focused to price-
focused, possibly due to the emergence of low cost carriers. This change is revealed in the next sections. 
Consumer complaints could also serve as an indication for other underlying operational problems with 
the airline that are causing consumers to be unsatisfied. Overall, with lower quality of service airlines 
suffer both in the short run (as they need to compensate those unhappy passengers) and in the longer 
run (as these consumers may defect to other airlines). Altogether, the results support Hypothesis 3. 
Before 9/11 After 9/11 
 Variable Unstandardized Coefficient T-stat. Unstandardized Coefficient T-stat. 
Operations 
Strategy 
Measures 
Focused -4.07E-02 -1.46 0.21*** 4.84 
FSC*Time -1.85E-02*** 
 
-7.35 
 
5.11E-03* 1.84 
Focused*Time -1.59E-02*** 
 
-5.66 
 
-3.38E-03 -1.24 
Stage Length -1.5E-04*** -3.74 -2.9E-04*** -4.86 
Seat Density 2.7.E-04 0.60 -2.6E-04 -0.34 
Productivity 
Measures 
Loading Factor 0.78*** 5.36 1.32*** 9.36 
Aircraft Utilization 0.23 1.64 0.2878* 2.15 
ASM per Employee 3.71E-07 0 1.27E-07 0 
Service Measures 
On-time Flight 2.04E-04 0.62 1.95E-03 1.33 
Mishandled Baggage 2.07E-03 -0.46 3.13E-03 0.82 
Ticket Oversales 3.5E-05 0.05 -5.6E-04 -0.48 
Consumer Complaints -2.04E-02** -3.47 -5.92E-03 -0.35 
Control Variables 
S&P 500 3.98E-4*** 6.55 -2E-05 -0.27 
Bankruptcy - - 1.72E-02 0.9 
 
Intercept -0.77*** -6.68 -1.15*** -5.61 
R
2
 0.634 0.734 
Sample Size 243 225 
Notes. Dependent variable: Operating Profit over Operating Revenue.  
*Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, ** at 0.05. *** at 0.01 
Table 1. Results of Parks method  
Post 9/11 analysis 
Before empirically testing the determinants of profitability (in Subsection 5.2.2), we first revisit the effect of 9/11 
on the airline industry. 
The Effect of 9/11 on airline industry revisited 
To further verify that the drop in profitability is sustained after 9/11, even after controlling for all other factors, we 
conduct a fixed-effect time series analysis to verify the presence of an enduring post 9/11 effect. Namely, we test 
whether the observed differences in profitability pre and post 9/11 can be primarily related to time factors only, 
and not to other profound changes in the previously mentioned measures. The fixed-effect model permits two-way 
effects: cross-sectional firm and time-series effect with the independent error structure vit, where i=1,2,…,N, and 
t=1,2,…,T, and identically distributed random variable with zero mean and variance of 
2
v, where N is the number of 
cross sections (i.e., the number of airlines) and T is the length of the time series for each cross section. The two-way 
fixed-effect model is presented below. 
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OPORit=(o+it1FSC · Timeit + 2Focused Timeit + 3Stage Lengthit + 4Seat Densityit + Loading 
Factorit + Aircraft Utilizationit + ASM per Employeeit + OnTime Flightit + Mishandled 
Baggageit+ 10Ticket Oversalesit +11Customer Complaintsit  
The parameter o represents the intercept of the model, while μ_i and γ_t are non-random parameters for cross-
sectional and time-series, respectively. The operations strategy, productivity and service measures are the same as 
those used in the previous section. The regression results of the two-way fixed-effect model are provided in Table 2. 
Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
T-stat. Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
T-stat. Variable 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
T-stat. 
Time-Series Effect Time-Series Effect Cross Section Firm Effect 
1995Q2 0.26*** 4.82 2001Q4 -0.02 -0.56 Alaska -0.02 -0.78 
1995Q3 0.30*** 6.35 2002Q1 -0.08 -1.69 American Eagle*** 0.31*** 3.25 
1995Q4 0.29*** 6.22 2002Q2 0.04 0.95 American -0.02 -0.51 
1996Q1 0.26*** 5.12 2002Q3 0.07* 1.96 American West** -0.07** -2.2 
1996Q2 0.25*** 5 2002Q4 0.00 -0.13 Continental -0.03 -0.69 
1996Q3 0.29*** 6.77 2003Q1 0.04 1.08 Delta -0.04 -1.22 
1996Q4 0.22*** 5.38 2003Q2 0.03 0.73 Northwest 0.04* 1.77 
1997Q1 0.23*** 4.85 2003Q3 0.09** 2.56 Southwest** 0.06** 2.22 
1997Q2 0.26*** 5.42 2003Q4 0.11*** 3.26 United* -0.07* -1.87 
1997Q3 0.27*** 6.48 2004Q1 0.10*** 2.79 Intercept -1.23*** -5.79 
1997Q4 0.25*** 6.11 2004Q2 0.07* 1.76 Operations Strategy 
1998Q1 0.27*** 5.98 2004Q3 0.05* 1.67 FSC*time 2.16E-03*** 3.73 
1998Q2 0.29*** 6 2004Q4 0.01 0.46 Stage Length -9E-05 -0.92 
1998Q3 0.27*** 6.71 2005Q1 -0.01 -0.38 Seat Density 1.98E-03** 2.19 
1998Q4 0.22*** 5.79 2005Q2 -0.01 -0.23 Productivity 
1999Q1 0.25*** 5.63 2005Q3 0.03 0.85 Loading Factor 0.95*** 5.04 
1999Q2 0.26*** 5.72 2005Q4 0.01 0.3 Aircraft Utilization 0.43*** 3.54 
1999Q3 0.28*** 7.07 2006Q1 0.00 0 ASM per Employee 9.14E-08 . 
1999Q4 0.24*** 6.16 2006Q2 0.00 0.11 Service Quality 
2000Q1 0.23*** 5.51 2006Q3 0.05 1.49 On-time Flight -2E-05 -0.07 
2000Q2 0.23*** 5.35 2006Q4 0.02 0.63 Mishandled Baggage 2.55E-03 0.84 
2000Q3 0.17*** 6.25 2007Q1 0.03 0.82 Ticket Oversales -2.4E-04 -0.32 
2000Q4 0.17*** 5.42 2007Q2 0.04 1.09 Consumer Complaints -6.24E-03 -1.09 
2001Q1 0.10*** 4.11 2007Q3 0.05 1.45 Other Control Variable 
2001Q2 0.17*** 4 2007Q4 0.04 1.04 S&P500 0 0 
2001Q3 0.10*** 2.6    Bankruptcy 1.62E-02 0.93 
R
2
 0.737  
Notes. Dependent variable: Operating Profit over Operating Revenue (OPOR) 
*Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, ** at 0.05. *** at 0.01 
Table 2. Results of fixed two-way effects regression analysis all periods 
Figure 2 visually depicts the time coefficients, t, from the model between the second quarter of 1995 and the last 
quarter of 2007. It is evident that all of the quarterly coefficients prior to 9/11 are significant (at the 0.1 level) and 
positive. Further, during most of the pre-9/11, these coefficients exhibit stable seasonal pattern with the 
coefficients lying between 0.2 and 0.3. The first dent in the coefficients occurs in Q3 of 2000—corresponding to the 
burst of the dot-com bubble—and thereafter the coefficients drop significantly. After 9/11, the coefficients do not 
appear to follow any pattern any more, and as can be observed, most of the coefficients after 9/11 are not 
significant. Evidently, the US domestic airline industry has entered a turbulent period. The few significant 
coefficients suggest that between Q3 of 2003 and 2004 the airline industry has shown some signs of life. Overall, 
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the average coefficient before (resp., after) 9/11 was 0.228 (resp., 0.042). This analysis corroborates the long lasting 
impact of 9/11 on the U.S. airline industry. 
 
Figure 2. Time-series coefficients from two-way fixed-effects 
Post 9/11 Analysis: Empirical results and discussion 
Estimating the model from Subsection 4.1 using post-9/11 data, we find that Parks’ method results explain 73.4% of 
the variations in profitability, as can be seen from Table 1. We find that focused airlines fared better after 9/11 as 
the variable Focused is significant and positive. Yet, over time, it is the FSCs that exhibit a consistent improvement 
in profitability, indicated by the positive and significant interaction term FSC*Time. Stage length persists with its 
negative and significant impact on profitability as before 9/11. Based on these findings, we conclude that 
accounting for operations strategy measures add significant value for the model after 9/11, i.e., Hypothesis 1a is 
supported. 
In the appendix wherein we explore the relative importance of the various categories, we further find that 
operations strategy is the single most important category in predicting profitability also post 9/11. 
We find that the productivity measure loading factor remains positive and significant as before 9/11. However, post 
9/11, this coefficient has almost doubled, indicating that filling up the planes became a much more important task, 
and that the revenue management systems have definitely been adjusted to allow for higher loading factors. 
Aircraft Utilization is also positive and significant (recall it was not significant before 9/11), indicating that airlines, 
after retiring many of their planes, may have been paying more attention to overall efficiency of their assets. In line 
with Weiss and Maher (2009), airlines that operate leaner fleets are likely to suffer less when demand declines. 
Overall, we find that productivity measures remain significant post 9/11, namely, Hypothesis 2a is supported as 
well.  
None of the service measures is significant after 9/11, which indirectly supports Hypothesis 3a. Service measures 
bear no power in predicting airlines profitability post 9/11. As Table A4 reveals, the correlation of Consumer 
Complaints with the other three service measures is very similar to that observed prior to 9/11. Yet, the coefficients 
and significance levels in our estimation results are very different than those prior to 9/11. As mentioned earlier, 
the lack of predictive power could stem from various causes. Consumers are likely more forgiven to service glitches, 
assuming that airlines are suffering and struggling from the intensified security measures, and, possibly, the 
consumers associate lack of service to security measures. We revisit this point in the following section. 
Our empirical results also have some implications for managers post 9/11 attack. We see that 1% increase in the 
coefficient of Loading Factor could result in 1.3 percentage points increase in OPOR; whereas 1% increases in 
aircraft utilization would increase OPOR by 0.29%. Given that post 9/11 the mean of OPOR is -3.26%, one could 
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appreciate the magnitude of potential benefits for airlines. Airlines have definitely been paying attention to the 
importance of these factors. For example, as Figure 3 shows, the loading factors at both focused and FSCs have 
increased significantly over the years, and this increase is more profound before and after 9/11. 
 
Figure 3. Loading factors in the U.S. domestic airline industry 
Robustness 
The analysis can be further segregated into studying the impacts of the various factors on focused and FSCs 
separately, by considering the following estimation: 
OPORit= o + 1Focusedi + 2FSC·Timeit + 3Focused · Timeit + 4FSC · Stage Lengthit + 5Focused · 
Stage Lengthit + 6FSC · Seat Densityit + 7Focused · Seat Densityit + 8FSC · Loading Factorit + 
9Focused · Loading Factorit + 10FSC · Aircraft Utilizationit + 11Focused · Aircraft Utilizationit + 
12FSC · ASM per Employeeit + 13Focused · ASM per Employeeit + 14FSC · OnTime Flightit + 
15Focused · OnTime Flightit + 16FSC · Mishandled Baggageit + 17Focused · Mishandled Baggageit + 
18FSC · Ticket Oversalesit + 19Focused · Ticket Oversalesit + 20FSC · Customer Complaintsit + 
21Focused · Customer Complaintsit 
For brevity, the estimation results of this model are omitted, as they are consistent with the findings reported 
above. However, such an analysis reveals, e.g., that loading factor has greater impact on FSCs. Namely, 1% increase 
in loading factor for FSCs results in 1.70 percentage point increase in OPOR vs. 0.86% point increase for focused 
airlines. This may further explain why FSCs have pushed to improve their loading factors more than focused airlines, 
as is visible from Figure 3. 
6. Determinants of consumers’ complaints 
In this section we isolate consumers’ complaints from the other service measures and set it as the dependent 
variable. We repeat the empirical using the same model from the Section 4 (first subsection) (by replacing OPOR 
with consumer complaints)—we keep the operational and strategic measures to control for the firms’ short and 
long term decisions, as well as the other control variables. Yet, our focus is on the remaining service measures. The 
empirical results are provided in Table 3. 
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Before 9/11 After 9/11 
 Variable Unstandardized Coefficient T-stat. Unstandardized Coefficient T-stat. 
Operations 
Strategy 
Measures 
Focused 0.17 0.31 -0.49*** -3.36 
FSC*Time 4.80E-02* 
 
1.73 
 
-2.03E-02 -1.53 
Focused*Time 2.92E-02 
 
0.75 
 
-2.15E-02* -1.72 
Stage Length 1.09E-03** 1.96 -2.6E-04 -1.15 
Seat Density 2.02E-03 0.38 5.35E-03* 1.72 
Productivity 
Measures 
Loading Factor 0.86 0.56 1.87** 2.47 
Aircraft Utilization -1.89* -1.73 2.19*** 3.26 
ASM per Employee -2.75E-06** -2.43 -1.54E-06*** -2.84 
Service Measures 
On-time Flight -3.54E-03 -0.91 -1.55E-02** -2.42 
Mishandled Baggage 0.12*** 2.67 8.18E-02*** 5.37 
Ticket Oversales 1.01E-02 1.38 1.77E-02*** 3.61 
Control Variables 
S&P 500 1.05E-3 1.56 6.68E-04* 1.77 
Bankruptcy - - -1.04 -1.33 
 
Intercept -0.61 -0.46 -0.77 -0.82 
R
2
 0.467 0.768 
Sample Size 243 225 
Notes. Dependent variable: Number of Complaints.  
* Significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, ** at 0.05, *** at 0.01 
Table 3. Results of Parks method on number of complaints 
Prior to 9/11, FSCs and Focused carriers have comparable amount of consumer complaints, as can be visually 
observed from Figure 4 and as is indicated by the lack of significance of the variable Focused. Yet, during this period, 
focused airlines start opening a gap over FSCs in terms of complaints. This is evident from the positive and 
significant coefficient of FSC*Time: while proportions of complaints have increased at both focused carriers and 
FSCs, the rate of increase is faster and significant at FSCs. Figure 4 also reveals that consumers complaints, after 
peaking during 2000, start declining: the first step downward occurred in 2000, while the second major drop in 
complaints happened in conjunction with 9/11. Indeed, both FSC*Time and Focused*Time are negative after 9/11, 
but only the measure of the focused carriers is significant after 9/11. Again, focused carriers further widen the gap 
in terms of complaint between them and FSCs. 
 
Figure 4. Consumers' complaints in the U.S. domestic airline industry 
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In practice, consumers in the airline industry complaint for a variety of reasons: flight problem, baggage, 
reservation, boarding, customer service, refunds, disability, frequent flyer program, fares, discrimination and 
advertising. In the regression conducted in Table 3, we account for three of those service categories: on-time 
performance (relates to flight problem), mishandled baggage, and ticket oversales (related to boarding).  
Prior to 9/11, only mishandled baggage shows strong positive significance. Naturally, as more baggage is 
mishandled, consumers tend to complaint more. The other service measures, on-time flight performance and ticket 
oversales, emerge as insignificant determinants to consumer complaints. Post 9/11, all three service measure are 
significant. Most profoundly, mishandled baggage remains highly significant but the magnitude of this coefficient 
dropped by more than 30%. This is the strongest indication that after 9/11 consumers tend to complaint less due to 
mishandled baggage. While surprising, this could be associated with the enhanced security measures that were 
imposed on airlines and at airports. Specifically, with stringent baggage inspection, passengers are incapable of 
judging whether a mishandled baggage was due to lack of service by the carrier or due to baggage security 
measures. Similarly, passengers may be more forgivable to mishandled baggage as they understand the additional 
scope of work required by airlines due to these security measures. 
The change in the coefficient of mishandled baggage stands in contrast to the change in the coefficient of ticket 
oversales. The latter, which is positive as expected, becomes significant after 9/11. We can provide two possible 
arguments. As consumers become more lenient to mishandled baggage, they pay closer attention to other service 
snafus, with ticket oversales being an easy target. Furthermore, after 9/11 airlines struggled to survive, many have 
retired large portions of their fleet thereby reducing the supply of seats over time, and faced pressure to fill up their 
planes. By doing so, they have potentially increased the amount of overbooking, which could have directly resulted 
with the increased complaint level due to ticket sales. This latter argument is further supported by the positive and 
significant coefficient of loading factor (note, however, from Table A4, that loading factor and ticket oversales are 
not significantly correlated), and to limited degree by aircraft utilization (which has increased, on average, by 0.3 
after 9/11 in our sample) – the coefficient of which reveals a significant positive correlation with consumer 
complaints after 9/11. 
Lastly, on-time flight performance also becomes a significant determinant to consumer complaints. Yet this measure 
turns out to have a negative magnitude. This result is surprising, unless it could also be an outcome of the enhanced 
security measures. 
7. Concluding remarks 
In this study, we examined the relationship between operations strategy, productivity, and service measures on 
profitability in the U.S. domestic airline industry. We find that before 9/11, all three types of measures are 
significant in explaining profitability. Full service carriers (FSCs) exhibit a declining profit trend over time. A negative 
impact on profitability is observed when the stage length increases. Both loading factors and aircraft utilization 
show strong impact, in terms of significant and large coefficients, on profitability. Consumer complaints is the only 
service measure that emerge as a significance variable in our model.  
After 9/11, it appears that FSCs are slowly improving their profits. Increase in stage length continues to show 
negative impact on profitability. Moreover, loading factors are found to have a much greater impact on profitability 
than before 9/11, whereas aircraft utilization becomes significant after 9/11. Interestingly, service measures are not 
significant after 9/11. 
Overall, we find support that operations measures and productivity measures are significant determinants in 
predicting airline profitability both before and after 9/11. However, service measures emerge as significant 
determinants only before the 9/11. Of interest is the consumer complaint measure that is significant before, but not 
after, 9/11. This has led us to further explore service measures after 9/11. The analysis of consumer complaints 
shows that the magnitude of the coefficient of mishandled baggage dropped by about 30%, suggesting that 
consumers complaint less due to baggage related issues: the enhanced security measures post-9/11 might 
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confound passengers’ ability to distinguish between the cause of the service glitches. Additionally, post-9/11, 
boarding denials emerge as significant determinant of complaints: indeed, with leaner supply of seats, carriers fill 
up their planes, and possibly overbook more frequently, resulting with larger numbers of passengers who are 
denied boarding. This argument is corroborated by the significance of the loading factor after 9/11. 
One of the main managerial implications relates to the importance of loading factors. Loading factors are found to 
be positive and significant in providing information about airlines’ profitability, and, hence, airlines are 
recommended to improve their loading factors. Indeed, airlines have been dramatically improving their loading 
factors since 9/11, and FSCs have improved their capacity utilizations better than focused carriers. Though, gains 
can be achieved by improving these loading factors, there is a limit to the extent to which they can be improved. 
Indeed, as loading factors improves, carriers resort to overbooking to ensure greater fill-rates, and consequently 
they end up with more complaints stemming from oversales. This bears the potential of harming carriers in the 
longer run. 
This work also suggests that it is important to understand the nature of a system-wide shock. In the case of the 
airline industry the shock has affected all carriers not only due to the decreased number of passengers but also due 
to the increased security measures imposed on airlines and airports. In this reality passengers possibly expect lower 
levels of service on several of the measures (specifically, mishandled baggage), and, indeed, they tend to complaint 
less. Corroborating this effect is the increasing role of low cost carriers in this industry, who train passengers to 
expect lower levels of service. 
Our study is also subject to few limitations. First, the number of airlines in our study is limited, as in many other 
similar studies. Namely, due to insufficient information, we included only Alaska, American Eagle, American West, 
and Southwest Airlines in our focused airline group. This may create some bias in the results for focused airlines. 
Second, we have not considered fuel costs in our model, which are also known to have strong impact on airline 
profitability, since different airlines have different contracts to supply their fuel needs. Third, as the data is in the 
form of cross-section time series, we use Parks’ method in SAS for analysis. However, due to the limitations of the 
built-in function in Parks’ method, we only use the first-order of autocorrelation in the model. One should test the 
model up to fourth order of autocorrelation (i.e., a lag of one year) using Parks’ method and choose the optimal 
order of autocorrelation for analysis. 
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Appendix 1. Tables 
 
 
All Airlines Full-Service Airlines Low Cost Carriers  
(N = 243) (N = 162) (N = 81) Data 
Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Source 
Profitability 
Op. Profit / Op. 
Revenue 
6.59 9.17 5.71 9.42 8.35 8.44 Form 41 (P-52) 
Operations 
Strategy 
Measure 
Stage Length 755.74 172.02 803.24 156.65 660.75 162.56 Form 41 (T2) 
Seat Density 145.38 13.13 149.74 13.76 136.64 4.95 Form 41 (T2) 
Productivity 
Measure 
Loading Factor 0.69 0.04 0.70 0.03 0.68 0.04 Form 41 (T2) 
Aircraft 
Utilization 
0.35 0.04 0.33 0.02 0.39 0.04 Form 41 (T2) 
ASM per 
Employee (in K) 
441.07 541.21 422.51 448.60 478.19 521.30 
Form 41 (P-10 & 
P-12) 
Service Measure 
On-time Flight 76.84 16.42 77.88 19.54 74.76 6.38 
Air Travel 
Consumer 
Report 
Mishandled 
Baggage 
4.99 1.19 5.07 1.07 4.83 1.38 
Ticket Oversales 20.97 7.38 
 
 
 
19.99 5.79 22.91 9.57 
Consumer 
Complaints 
1.59 1.42 1.65 1.20 1.46 1.78 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics for all variables before 9/11 (27 quarters prior to 9/11) 
 
 
All Airlines Full-Service Airlines Low Cost Carriers  
 (N = 225) (N = 150) (N = 75) Data 
 Variable Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. Source 
Profitability 
Op. Profit / Op. 
Revenue 
-3.26 12.25 -7.09 11.26 4.39 10.49 Form 41 (P-52) 
Operations 
Strategy Measure 
Stage Length 813.74 234.00 918.44 168.76 604.35 204.31 Form 41 (T2) 
Seat Density 137.73 34.19 153.30 10.76 106.57 42.79 Form 41 (T2) 
Productivity 
Measure 
Loading Factor 0.75 0.06 0.77 0.05 0.70 0.05 Form 41 (T2) 
Aircraft 
Utilization 
0.35 0.06 0.35 0.05 0.35 0.07 Form 41 (T2) 
ASM per 
Employee (in K) 
487.66 124.95 493.53 80.81 475.92 184.12 
Form 41 (P-10 
& P-12) 
Service Measure 
On-time Flight 77.77 5.01 77.99 4.93 77.33 5.18 
Air Travel 
Consumer 
Report 
Mishandled 
Baggage 
5.62 2.75 5.12 1.89 6.62 3.76 
Ticket 
Oversales 
14.17 5.16 15.29 5.02 11.92 4.72 
Consumer 
Complaints 
1.00 0.58 1.22 0.55 0.55 0.33 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for all variables after 9/11 (25 quarters post 9/11) 
 
Stage 
Length 
Seat 
Capacity 
Loading 
Factor 
Aircraft 
Utilization ASME 
Flight 
Delay 
Mishandle 
Baggage 
Tickets 
Oversales 
Consumer 
Complaints S&P500 
LCC -0.39
c 
-0.47
c 
-0.27
c 
0.69
 c
 0.49
 c
 -0.09 -0.09 0.19
 c
 -0.07 0 
Stage Length 1 0.40
c 
0.29
 c
 -0.05
 c
 0.12
a 
-0.05 0.19
 c
 0.30
 c
 0.42
 c
 0.19
 c
 
Seat Capacity 1 0.19
 c
 -0.18
 c
 0.23
 c
 0.05 0.21
 c
 0.14
 b
 0.11
 a
 0.01 
Loading Factor 1 -0.11
a 
0.11
 a
 0.03 -0.12
 a
 -0.02 0.30
 c
 0.41
 c
 
Aircraft Utilization 1 0.45
 c
 -0.05 0.01 0.19
 c
 -0.04 0.01 
ASME 1 0.06 -0.02 0.21
 c
 0.10 0.06 
Flight Delay 1 -0.17
 c
 -0.16
b
 -0.21
 c
 -0.17
 c
 
Mishandle Baggage 1 -0.02 0.14 -0.04 
Ticket Oversales 1 0.25
 c
 0.01 
Consumer Complaints 1 0.60
 c
 
Bankruptcy 0 
S&P500 1 
a
Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, 
b
 at 0.05, 
c
 at 0.01. 
Note. The variable Bankruptcy is omitted, since prior to 9/11 none of the airlines in our sample were under bankruptcy protection 
Table A3. Correlation matrix using Parks' method pre 9/11 
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LCC -0.63
 c
 -0.65
c 
-0.51
 c
 0.00 -0.07 -0.06 0.26
 c
 -0.31
 c
 -0.55
 c
 -0.29
 c
 0 
Stage 
Length 
1 0.73
 c
 0.59
 c
 0.37
 c
 0.40
 c
 -0.06 -0.46
 c
 0.12 0.29
 c
 0.18
 c
 0.13
b 
Seat Capacity 1 0.44
 c
 0.52
 c
 0.65
 c
 0.13 -0.62
 c
 0.36
 c
 0.27
 c
 0.23
 c
 0.06 
Loading Factor 1 0.33
 c
 0.38
 c
 -0.44
 c
 -0.03 -0.14 0.39
 c
 0.22
 c
 0.57
 c
 
Aircraft Utilization 1 0.59
 c
 -0.16
b 
-0.21
 c
 -0.03 0.09 -0.05 0.31
 c
 
ASME 1 0.03 -0.37
 c
 -0.01 -0.16
b 
0.22
 c
 0.28
 c
 
Flight Delay 1 -0.50
 c
 0.25
 c
 -0.33
 c
 0.03 -0.66
 c
 
Mishandle Baggage 1 -0.40
 c
 0.22
 c
 -0.13
a 
0.41
 c
 
Ticket Oversales 1 0.22
 c
 0.23
 c
 -0.30
 c
 
Consumer Complaints 1 0.01 0.31
 c
 
Bankruptcy 1 0.01 
S&P500 1 
a
Signified significant at 0.10 in a two-tail test, 
b
 at 0.05, 
c
 at 0.01. 
Table A4. Correlation matrix using Parks' method post 9/11 
Appendix 2. On the relative importance of operations strategy, productivity, and service 
We have studied the relationship between each category of measures (Operations Strategy, Productivity, and 
Service) and firms’ financial performance. Combining all three categories, we argue that operations strategy, as a 
category, provides the greatest explanatory power in predicting profitability of airlines. Operations strategy 
decisions, as the title implies, reflect long-term strategic decisions made by the firm’s decision makers. Since so, we 
expect operation strategy to exhibit the most important link to profitability. Among the remaining two categories, 
productivity and service, we suspect productivity to shed more light on profitability than service. We believe that 
some, and potentially even most, of the passengers may self-select themselves into airlines which provide certain 
levels of service. Namely, passengers may still choose to fly on a carrier offering lower fares even if they expect 
lower levels of service, and also even if they happen to experience service failures. Hence, service measures may 
take longer to affect airlines’ profitability. On the other hand, productivity measures are directly linked to airlines’ 
immediate financial performance. For example, increasing utilization of aircrafts implies more flights, and, 
consequently, greater profit. To summarize, we hypothesize that both before and after 9/11, operations strategy 
measures contribute greater explanatory power to profitability than productivity measures, which, in turn, provide 
greater explanatory power than service measures. We test this hypothesis by studying the R2 of models wherein we 
account on for particular sets of measures. These are provided in Table A5, which supports our hypothesis. 
 
Operations 
Strategy 
Productivity Service 
Operations 
Strategy & 
Productivity 
Operations 
Strategy & 
Service 
Productivity 
& Service 
Operations 
Strategy, 
Productivity 
& Service 
R
2
 
Before 
9/11 
0.519 0.325 0.175 0.604 0.594 0.365 0.634 
After 
9/11 
0.638  0.5623 0.047 0.705 0.630 0.448 0.734 
tendency increase increase decrease increase increase increase increase 
Note. Dependent variable: Operating Profit over Operating Revenue (OPOR)  
All models include the two control variables (S&P500 and Bankruptcy). Arrows indicate change in R
2
 between before and after 
9/11. 
Table A5. R-Square comparison of the different sub-models before and after 9/11 
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